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　安倍晋三首相は総理就任後初の外遊先として東南アジアを訪問し、安倍政権の外交方針を掲げ
た「日本外交の新たな5原則」を発表した。このASEANに重きを置く外交方針は、安倍ドクトリン
と称されることがある。安倍ドクトリンは日・ASEAN関係の強化を図るものであるが、安倍政権の
ASEAN外交はこの意図に相反する結果をもたらす恐れがある。それは、第一に普遍的・自由主義的
価値を重視していること、第二に対中の側面が強く出ていることに起因する。特に後者は、ASEAN
諸国の懸念を生んでいる。
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 There is a widespread perception across 
Southeast Asia today that Japan’s presence in 
the region is fading into the sunset. The Jakar-
ta Post, for example, posted an article regard-
ing the role of Japan in Southeast Asia and 
noted that Japan’s role and influence depend on 
whether China’s influence will wax or wane.1 
As the United States, China, and India are 
strengthening their ties with the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in recent 
years through policies known or dubbed as 
rebalancing, charm offensive, and Look East, 
Japan has generally followed the same path 
in part to dispel such a view that Japan is in 
decline. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited all 
the ten ASEAN countries in 2013, held a com-
memorative summit in Tokyo to mark the 40th 
anniversary of their partnership, and mani-
fested five principles that Japan would seek to 
achieve with ASEAN. The enunciation of the 
five principles of Japan’s ASEAN diplomacy 
amounted to the announcement of the Abe 
Doctrine.2
 This paper analyzes the recent developments 
in Japan’s ASEAN diplomacy, especially that of 
the Abe administration. It submits that while 
Japan is striving to enhance its relations with 
ASEAN, Japanese diplomacy based on the Abe 
Doctrine may have an adverse effect on its 
ASEAN ties, thereby weakening, not strength-
ening, their cooperation. The first two sections 
of this paper discuss Abe’s ASEAN diplomacy, 
its aims and implications for Japan-ASEAN 
cooperation. The third section suggests a way 
forward for their relations. 
1. The Abe administration and ASEAN
 Some experts in Southeast Asia think that 
the message Prime Minister Abe sought to con-
vey in his January 2013 trip to ASEAN coun-
tries—his first official visit overseas in his sec-
ond term as Japan’s premier—is this: Japan is 
back in Southeast Asia.3 Some even described 
his ASEAN diplomacy as “Japan’s rebalancing” 
and “Japan’s ASEAN charm offensive.” 4 But 
to be sure, Japan has never left the region. 
Since the elaboration of the Fukuda Doctrine 
in 1977, Japan emphasized economic aspects 
of cooperation and provided aid to Southeast 
Asian countries to promote their state-building 
and economic development. Since the 1990s, 
Japan and ASEAN have expanded cooperation 
to include security cooperation. Japan sent its 
very first peacekeeping mission to Cambodia; 
has provided assistance in curbing piracy and 
helped build maritime law enforcement capa-
bilities of ASEAN countries; and has actively 
engaged in regional institutions including the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia 
Summit, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 
Meeting Plus. 
 Why, then, has the Abe Doctr ine drawn 
attention from countries in Southeast Asia? 
This is because the Abe Doctr ine is more 
strategically-driven than the previous Japa-
nese policy and sets Japan-ASEAN relations 
in the context of rivalry against China.5 The 
Abe Doctrine outlines five principles: 1) pro-
tection of universal values such as freedom of 
thought, expression, and speech; 2) ensuring 
the rule of law at sea; 3) pursuit of free, open, 
interconnected economies; 4) strengthening 
of intercultural ties; and 5) promotion of youth 
exchange. Among them, the first two principles 
are worthy of note. 
 The first principle implicates Abe’s vision of 
constructing a regional order based on univer-
sal or liberal values. In his first term as prime 
minister, Abe promoted the arc of freedom and 
prosperity, which laid importance on enhanc-
ing ties with countries which share values such 
as democracy, freedom, human rights, and 
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rule of law. This values-based diplomacy con-
tinues to lay the foundation of the second Abe 
administration. In his essay titled “Asia’s Dem-
ocratic Security Diamond,” Abe envisaged to 
form a diamond among Japan, Australia, India, 
and the US state of Hawaii to cope with the 
disputes in the East China Sea and the South 
China Sea. He then stressed the importance of 
values: “Japan’s diplomacy must always be root-
ed in democracy, the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights. These universal values have 
guided Japan’s postwar development. I firmly 
believe that, in 2013 and beyond, the Asia-Pa-
cific region’s future prosperity should rest on 
them as well.” 6
 The first principle of the Abe Doctrine clear-
ly reflects his values-based diplomacy. Abe sees 
ASEAN as a partner which shares universal 
values: “The development of the ASEAN mem-
bers has been marked by respect for the rule of 
law and human rights, along with steady moves 
toward deeply rooted democracy.” 7 The Diplo-
matic Bluebook 2013 also writes that as Japan 
enhances its cooperative relationships with 
countries with which Japan shares fundamen-
tal values, “ASEAN is becoming more and more 
important for Japan.” 8
 The second principle of the Abe Doctrine—
ensuring the rule of law at sea—undoubtedly 
has China’s assertive maritime activities in 
mind. This is evident from his speech: “Both 
Japan and ASEAN are connected with the rest 
of the world by the broad oceans. I believe we 
must work together side by side to make our 
world one of freedom and openness, ruled 
not by might but law.” 9 These principles—
emphasis on universal values and rule of law 
at sea—were reiterated when Abe paid a visit 
to Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines in 
July 2013. The Abe Doctrine bears in mind the 
notion that Japan and ASEAN must cooperate 
with one another so as to effectively cope with 
their common concern; that is China.
 The Abe Doctrine implies references that 
Tokyo strives to draw ASEAN away from China 
and bring it closer to Japan. In fact, Japan-ASE-
AN relations in the 2000s have developed 
as if to counter fast-growing China-ASEAN 
relations.10 For example, Japan’s efforts to 
strengthen defense cooperation with ASEAN 
countries have been accelerated by China’s 
assertive behavior in the East China Sea and 
the South China Sea. Developments in bilateral 
defense cooperation between Japan and the 
Philippines and Vietnam indicate this. In Sep-
tember 2011, the Japanese Maritime Self-De-
fense Force and the Philippine Navy held their 
first dialogue on maritime and oceanic affairs 
and agreed to promote cooperation between 
the defense authorities of the two states. On 
the occasion of Prime Minister Abe’s visit to 
Manila in July 2013, he agreed with Philippine 
President Benigno Aquino that defense author-
ities and coast guard agencies of the two coun-
tries would undertake joint exercises. Abe also 
announced that Japan would provide ten patrol 
vessels to bolster the capacity of the Philippine 
Coast Guard. In a similar vein, Japan signed 
w ith Vietnam a memorandum on defense 
cooperation and exchange in October 2011 
and agreed to promote defense cooperation, 
including regular dialogue at the vice-ministe-
rial level and cooperation in humanitarian and 
disaster relief. To reflect this agreement, the 
Japanese government decided to provide six 
patrol ships as part of its official development 
assistance, all of which are scheduled to be 
delivered by the end of 2014.
2. The Abe Doctrine and its implications
 Given the geostrategic importance of South-
east Asia that connects the Indian and the 
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Pacific Oceans, ASEAN will be a vital partner 
for Japan to build a liberal, open, rules-based 
order in the Asia-Pacific. The consolidation of 
Japan-ASEAN cooperation may raise Japan’s 
profile in Southeast Asia. However, if the Abe 
administration pursues its ASEAN diplomacy 
too vigorously, it may have an adverse effect on 
Japan-ASEAN relations, militating against the 
very intention of the Abe Doctrine.
 There are two risks. First, i f Japan over-
emphasizes un iversa l or l ibera l va lues in 
its approach, it may undermine the unity of 
ASEAN. It is true, as Abe says, that ASEAN 
has shown some progress in human rights 
and democracy, as the Indonesian case illus-
trates. Though ASEAN advocates adherence 
to the principles of democracy, rule of law, and 
respect for and protection of human rights in 
its ASEAN Charter, such principles have not 
yet taken root throughout ASEAN. It will take 
more time until these principles are genuinely 
shared by all the ASEAN member countries. 
The outlook that the permeation of liberal val-
ues does not come about so soon is not so mis-
placed when we recall the process of drafting 
the ASEAN Security Community, or now the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). 
 One of the tasks of the APSC is political 
development. This item, however, was once 
removed from the Bal i Concord II. ASEAN 
excluded it because the members equated 
political development with democratization. 
Indonesia managed to persuade other ASEAN 
partners to reinsert political development in 
the “Vientiane Action Programme,” only after 
they understood that it meant preventing an 
“unconstitutional” change of regimes, where 
unconstitutional is taken to mean that local 
or foreign democrats use social and political 
unrest to overthrow an autocratic status quo.11 
Some ASEAN countries take political develop-
ment more as domestic political order than as 
democratization. 
 Given this much ado, if Japan overstress-
es universal / l iberal values in its relations 
with ASEAN, it may weaken the solidarity of 
ASEAN.12 Since the ASEAN Community is in 
the making by the end of 2015, ASEAN will not 
allow itself to be divided over values. Japan’s 
values-based diplomacy will in consequence 
alienate ASEAN from itself. This is contrary to 
what Abe seeks to achieve with ASEAN. 
 Second, diplomacy that is based on the idea 
that China is the common adversary for both 
Japan and ASEAN may keep the latter from 
strengthening cooperation with Japan. Japan 
and some ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malay-
sia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) are indeed 
confronted by China with its claims over the 
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and 
the Spratly and the Paracel Islands in the 
South China Sea respectively. They both have 
the same anxiety about China’s increasingly 
assertive actions in these waters. Given their 
shared concern, some argue that strengthening 
Japan-ASEAN security cooperation is a real-
istic option because “China is their common 
adversary.” 13 However, it would be premature 
to think that Japan and ASEAN have the com-
mon objective of confronting China. 
 The perception that China is a threat is 
strong especially in the Philippines, followed by 
Vietnam. The Philippines is explicit in welcom-
ing Japan’s more active contribution to regional 
security as a counterweight against China. 
In an interview with the Financial Times, 
Philippine Foreign Minister Albert Del Rosario 
said that Manila would welcome Japan’s rear-
mament since it serves as a counterbalance to 
China’s rise.14 But, such a view is not commonly 
held by all the ASEAN member countries. In 
his remarks in Tokyo in December 2013, former 
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Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoy-
ono stated that stable relations between Japan 
and China were critical to future regional secu-
rity and it was important that Japan’s security 
role be “pursued gradually.” 15 This divergence 
over Japan’s role vis-à-vis China among ASEAN 
countries stems from the division over their 
perception on China. 
 The differences in the perception of China 
were i l lustrated most recently by the 45th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the ASEAN 
Summit in 2012. Bitter words were exchanged 
between Cambodia on the one hand and the 
Philippines and Vietnam on the other over the 
wording of the South China Sea dispute in 
ASEAN’s statement, culminating for the first 
time in non-adoption of such a statement in 
ASEAN’s history. 
 What ASEAN strives to achieve is to pre-
vent major powers such as the U.S. and China 
from becoming dominant in the region so that 
it can maintain its influence and centrality in 
the construction of regional order. ASEAN is 
pursuing equidistance diplomacy through bal-
ancing its relations with the major powers by 
cultivating amicable relations with them, but 
at the same time avoiding taking sides. As the 
Malaysia Prime Minister Najib Razak stated at 
the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2012: “China is our 
partner. The United States is also our partner. 
And this evening I say clearly to our friends 
from America, from China, Russia, India and 
beyond: we in ASEAN share your values and 
your aspirations, and we urge you to work with 
us. It is not about taking sides.” 16
 Because ASEAN seeks to be relatively neu-
tral to major powers and avoid favoring one 
country over another, Japan’s ASEAN diploma-
cy must not be understood as seeking an ally 
or partner against China. If ASEAN perceives 
Japan’s policy as such, the Association will be 
hesitant about expanding cooperation with 
Japan. After Abe’s enunciation of the Five Prin-
ciples, though some welcomed it as a sign of 
Japan’s commitment to Southeast Asia, reports 
abounded with titles such as “Japan’s Abe 
turns to Southeast Asia to counter China.” 17 
As expected, the Abe Doctrine raised con-
cerns among ASEAN countries. Simon Tay, 
chairman of the Singapore Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, warned that “Asean must not 
be dragged into an anti-China coalition with 
Japan.” 18
 A harsher assessment came from Tang Siew 
Mun, director for foreign policy and security 
studies at the ISIS Malaysia, who similarly cau-
tioned ASEAN to be alert to Japan’s attempts 
to link the South China Sea disputes with that 
in the East China Sea. He argued that the Abe 
Doctrine could even “damage Japanese diplo-
macy” and urged Japan not to use ASEAN-Ja-
pan relations “as a means to other ends.” 19 
Given ASEAN’s divided stance vis-à-vis China, 
Tokyo’s diplomacy based on the assumption 
that Japan and ASEAN share the objective of 
confronting China seriously limits the potential 
for furthering relations between the two. 
3. Keeping a low profile on China
 W h i le the possibi l ity that Japan’s va l-
ues-based diplomacy comes into full swing 
in its ASEAN diplomacy cannot be total ly 
dismissed, it is not very likely that this would 
happen in the foreseeable future. Tokyo has 
never in its diplomatic history promulgated 
liberal values as vigorously as other countries 
l ike the United States. Thus far, despite its 
pronouncement neither has the Abe adminis-
tration. A more likely diplomatic course that 
Japan would attempt to take is to gang up with 
ASEAN against China. However, as this paper 
has shown, it would be counterproductive to 
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Japan-ASEAN relations. 
 ASEAN’s equidistance diplomacy is not 
novel. In fact, it has maintained it since during 
the Cold War. Former Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad once explained Malay-
sia’s foreign policy, saying “we want to remain 
equidistant from the big powers, the United 
States, China, and the Soviet Union.” 20 Such a 
line of policy is not only held by Malaysia but its 
other ASEAN counterparts. Considering that 
this long-practiced equidistance diplomacy of 
ASEAN will likely persist, Japan must design a 
policy that is compatible with ASEAN’s relative 
neutralism. 
 Will ASEAN shy away from strengthening 
relations with Japan? Only if it comes to per-
ceive that Japan’s policy is so anti-China-driv-
en that its cooperation with Japan will upset 
China and split it into pro-China and anti-Chi-
na camps. Setting Japan-ASEAN relations in 
the context of Japan-China rivalry certainly 
would not help. But the Abe administration 
should know better. Tokyo knows that China is 
a partner too important for ASEAN to alienate 
or antagonize, as much as it is to Japan. 
 At the same time, Tokyo is also aware that 
many ASEAN countries do share apprehen-
sions regarding China’s assertive maritime 
behavior. This led Japan and ASEAN to the 
endorsement of ensuring freedom and safety 
of navigation and overflight in accordance with 
the principles of international law, includ-
ing the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.21 Many ASEAN countries 
are also modernizing their defense maritime 
capabilities in part to respond to China’s mil-
itary modernization. Japanese assistance to 
improve their capabilities in a non-provoca-
tive fashion will be most appreciated. Against 
this backdrop, Japan needs a more nuanced 
form of foreign policy toward ASEAN. Mend-
ing Japan-China relations would also al lay 
ASEAN’s anxiety about Tokyo’s China-driv-
en strategy, pav ing the way for enhanced 
Japan-ASEAN ties. It would serve the interests 
of both Japan and ASEAN when the Japanese 
government seeks to intensify its own assets in 
Southeast Asia, rather than undermine those of 
China. 
Notes
1 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Japan’s new diplomatic 
ASEAN roadmap,” The Jakarta Post, October 
20, 2010. For a more recent account, see Bhub-
hundar Singh, “Abe’s First Overseas Trip: Why 
Southeast Asia?” RSIS Commentaries No. 6, 
January 14, 2013. 
2 It should be noted that the Abe Doctrine stresses 
other aspects of Japanese policy as well, includ-
ing Japan-U.S. alliance and proactive pacifism 
(proactive contribution to peace).
3 Tang Siew Mun, “Pitfalls of the Abe Doctrine,” 
New Straits Times, February 12, 2013, p. 17; 
Singh, “Abe’s First Overseas Trip: Why Southeast 
Asia?”
4 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Japan’s rebalancing strat-
egies with sea,” The Nation, January 14, 2013; 
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Japan’s ASEAN 
Charm Offensive,” January 24, 2013, available 
from 
 http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/24/
japans_asean_charm_offensive (accessed August 
20, 2013). 
5 Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s Approach to Southeast 
Asia in the Context of Sino-Japanese Relations,” 
The Asan Forum, October 17, 2014, 
 http://www.theasanforum.org/japans-approach-
to-southeast-asia-in-the-context-of-sino-japa-
nese-relations (accessed November 7, 2014).
6 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic 
Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, Decem-
ber 27, 2012, 
 https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shin-
zo-abe
時評論文　Japan’s New ASEAN Diplomacy? Why the Abe Doctrine May Be Counterproductive
29
7 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “The Bounty of the 
Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese 
Diplomacy,” January 18, 2013. Abe was sched-
uled to deliver his speech during his visit to 
Indonesia, but it was cancelled because his trip 
was cut short. However, the text of his scheduled 
speech is available from 
 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/state-
ment/201301/18speech_e.html (accessed January 
28, 2013).
8 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 
Diplomatic Bluebook 2013: Summary (Tokyo: 
April 2013), p. 7. 
9 Abe, “The Bounty of the Open Seas.” Emphasis 
added.
10 Tamotsu Fukuda, “Nihon to ASEAN,” in Toshihiro 
Minohara, ed., Zero-Nendai Nihon no Judai 
Ronten (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 2011), pp. 105-
125.
11 Rizal Sukma, “Political Development: A Democra-
cy Agenda for ASEAN?” in Donald K. Emmerson, 
ed., Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and 
Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacif-
ic Research Center, 2008), pp. 137-8
12 On this point, I am indebted to David Martin 
Jones, “Security and Democracy: the ASEAN 
charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in 
South-East Asia,” International Affairs, 84:4 
(2008), pp. 735-756.
13 “Japan seeks defence ties with Asean amid China 
rows,” The Straits Times, March 13, 2013. 
14 “Philippine backs the rearming of Japan,” The 
Financial Times, December 10, 2012, p. 1. 
15 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Building 
Regional Architecture for Common Peace, Stabil-
ity and Prosperity,” speech delivered at a policy 
forum of the Japan Institute of International 
Affairs, Tokyo, December 13, 2013. 
16 Dato’ Sri Najib Tun Razak, “Shangri-La Dialogue 
2012 Keynote Address,” Singapore, June 3, 2012.  
17 “Japan’s Abe turns to Southeast Asia to coun-
ter China,” Reuters, January 15, 2013; “Abe 
cements ties with Southeast Asia to counter 
China,” Kyodo News, January 18, 2013; “Japan 
seeks ASEAN backing on China with $25 bil-
lion pledge,” The Straits Times, December 14, 
2013. The last article was posted on newspaper 
websites of several ASEAN countries. For a view 
welcoming the Abe Doctrine, see Rizal Sukma, 
“The promise of a new Japan,” The Jakarta Post, 
January 26, 2013. 
18 Simon Tay, “The right balance,” Commentary, 
Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Janu-
ary 23, 2013. 
19 Tang, “Pitfalls of the Abe Doctrine.”
20 “Mahathir: Vietnam Won’t Attack Us,” Bangkok 
Post, August 15, 1981, p. 1.
21 “Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan Friendship 
and Cooperation,” Tokyo, December 14, 2013. 
